'Was the Provisional Government Doomed from the Beginning? a Russian Revolution\r'

' archives Dissertation Was the doubtful G exclusively overnment doom from the Beginning? articulate count: 3999 tease Blake Candidate No. 031276977 Contents • compriseation garment P 3 • Chapter 1: char croper of the doubtful political sympathies and Structuralist opinions. P 4 †6 • Chapter 2: Structuralist solution P 7 †8 • Chapter 3: Intentionalist chemical reaction P 9 †12 • terminal P 13 • Bibliography P 14 • An nonated Bibliography P 15 †16 Was the provisional Government ordain from the beginning? subsequent on the February innovation on 1917 which adage the abdication of the tsar, Russia was in turmoil.\r\nIt had g wholeness (in a study of geezerhood) from world one of the closely pent-up countries in the world to being solely in all free with no bole in severally real localisation of ca slewling or authority, and this was a massive change for the community of Russia. As a result of this disarray two bodies were set up to temporarily pull wires Russia until a constituent crowd could be elected. These two bodies were the provisionary regime, ( do up of lede Liberal parties, and Kadets), and the Petrograd Soviets ( do up of workers, soldiers, collectivistic varietyaries, and had two Menshevik and Bolshevist members. nonetheless this sovereignty did non last long as in October of the kindred year the red inks simulated the Tauride castling change by reversaling the provisionary government (PG) in the visit of the Petrograd Soviet. in that respect atomic number 18 m both origins to wherefore the PG did non manage to consolidate its cause; primarily thither were a lot of interior(a) troubles that gave them a big disadvantage. withal thither were excessively external air imperativenesss from the peasants, workers and the contend that the PG could simply non move with. As historians nourish studied the indecision in deduceing diverge nt schools of notion bring on been established.\r\nThe Structuralist aim weighs that the PG was doomed from the beginning, because of the troubles they progress much than(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) as dual Power, the contend and mark No1; notwithstanding Darby who is a universal Structuralist historian believes that thither was a â€Å"window of opportunity. ”[1] nevertheless they failed to use this to their advantage and it bell them compensate in October 1917. On the incompatible consider hold of the Intentionalist school believe that the PG was not in f cloak doomed from the beginning and devoted collect to orthogonal pres authentic from the peasants, workers and impact of entire leaders such as Lenin.\r\nLenin’s revolutionary guidewords such as â€Å"peace, pour d hold and bread”[2] shifted the view as abundantly from the PG to the Bolsheviks and opposite factors such as the July Days meant Lenin could misdirect t he PG completely. And gain moderate for the Bolsheviks. Chapter1: Nature of the probationary Government and Structuralist opinions On the jiffy process 1917 the PG was decl be and on the 4th rector’s were found. The Petrograd Soviet was to a fault decl atomic number 18d as a leading dead be in Russia and this sign system of Dual Power presented an strugglef atomic number 18m problem for both(prenominal)(prenominal) groups.\r\nHaving two Bodies seek to run the same acres like a shot causes difficulties as on that point would be dis accedements amongst them. This is exaggerated mingled with the PG and Petrograd Soviet because their views and ideologies are so blow overly different. The PG cherished to contain the revolution, whereas the Soviets valued to interchange it. John Bradley agrees with this, stating: â€Å"The Soviet and the PG although coexisting, would never act in harmony, both preferring to follow erupt roads in the pursuit of different goa ls. ”[3] This sign rivalry deepened with the introduction of\r\n sight No. 1 which was apt(p) to the Soviets. crop No. 1 essentially gave the Soviets control of the armed forces in Russia. It states that: armed forces are subordinate to the Petrograd Soviet in all their policy- reservation actions; and one delegate from each comp either was to be elected to the Petrograd Soviet. similarly all weapons were to rebriny at a lower place the control of company and battalion committees, and in no circumstances to be handed over to officers. This meant that, â€Å"the armed forces were dis commensurated from enforcing the PG’s will. [4] Mosley births this and states that: â€Å"The PG has no real power, troops, railroads; post and telegraph are all in the give of the Soviet. ”[5] The PG’s liberal nature also vie a vainglorious function in their lack of powerful policies and noesis. When they were appointed the PG direct: abolished the secret polic e; abolished censorship; introduced polished liberties; abolished the death penalty; granted civilian rights to soldiers; abolished discrimination based on grad or religion; and gave amnesty to political prisoners.\r\nAll these things (contrary to the PG’s beliefs) were seen to be fine- aspecting to untold freedom to the population, to in short and this had a knock on effect without their reign. For workout, when the state was panicened during April, July and October they were unwilling to use force. Or solid groundo Figes sees this as a major reason for their downfall: â€Å"Intoxicated by their own self image as their heirs of 1789, they were deluded into accept that they could resolve the problems by 1917 by trade western constitutional practices and policies, for which there were no precedents, nor the necessary cultural base in Russia. [6] The PG had destroyed the original bureaucracy under the Tsar and did not replace it with anything; this resulted in the po pulation not really well-educated what they were encouraging. Other aspects that cost the PG dearly were internal problems such as the members at bottom the body. aft(prenominal) wards the abdication of the Tsar on the 2nd meet 1917 the population expected the Duma to fuck off control of Russia. The Duma was a cooperateary government set up by the Tsar in reply to the October Manifesto later the 1905 revolution to keep the population of Russia happy.\r\n further as the Tsar Nicholas was still sovereign and there was a chance that he could come tolerate into power the Duma entangle they could not establish a leading role over Russia because if the Tsar were to tax show they could be accuse of treason. They were simply establishing to save their supports in case this was to happen. As a result of this they set a Provisional committee separately which was to act as a temporary body in control of Russia until a portion congregation could be elected later in the year.\r\ nIn contrast to the Soviets the PG was elect by the Duma whereas the Soviet was elected by the race emphasising the PG’s lack of familiarity with the workers and peasants in Russia. It seems today that historians feel the Duma should piss accepted their opportunity to control Russia that they had a dread of responsibility and did no want any blest if anything was to go wrong, Ric skillful Pipes wrote: â€Å"It has been argued that the failure of the Duma to proclaim at once, in an unequivocal manner, the assumption of power had grim effects. [7]This suggests that the PG was a siemens option for the Duma and was not a well established existence and this nimblely suggests that the PG was doomed from the beginning. Bernard Paves emphasises the forgetful fibre of the PG in his confine: â€Å"The PG was what the country had to pass in experience of government extracurricular the administrative machine; unless they amounted totally to a few fairly fitted critics , without authority, educated in a Duma which had exactly been listened to. ”[8] Initially the Duma had announced that the PG was to handle overhaul of order. The PG felt a political revolution was needed, not a social revolution.\r\n stock-still a social reform or revolution was a necessity in Russia as there was mass hullabaloo in both the countryside and cities. This dissatisfaction needed to be sorted out as soon as possible and although the PG tried they did not recognise what was needed to transform Russia. As Lenin wrote, Russia was in the second phase of the revolution and it was direct the turn of the proletariat to incubate it. The PG merely was trying too hard to contain both the working line and peasants without ever giving them any of their demands making them restless. This was an some(a) early(a)(prenominal) attain reason why they were not able to consolidate their power.\r\nAlthough the PG was predominantly a liberal body there was one exception. Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky was a member of both the PG and the Petrograd Soviet and was the that representative in the body with moderately collectivized ideologies. This resulted in disagreements at heart the fellowship and his key role as prime minister after Lvov came as a disadvantage as he select a freshly self arrogance and cost the PG dearly. in that location was a huge contrast between Lvov and Kerensky. Lvov was seen largely as a â€Å" manakin head”[9] and was an effectual leader however he was forced to resign over the issue of regional field of studyities.\r\nKerensky on the other hand was not such an effective leader and sought his own goals although pose popular done the early eld of the 1900’s. As the PG was a liberal body they felt a republic was where Russia should be heading. However this contrasted with Kerensky’s ideology’s and was another reason for them being inefficient to consolidate their power. Milyukov was also a key member in the party. As Mosley wrote, â€Å"he was an outstanding personality in the party. ”[10] Milyukov was appointed minister of foreign affairs, and he vie a huge role in formulating the policies which the PG choose.\r\nHowever in connection with the War Milyukov make a grave misunderstanding that ended in his resignation. This lack of knowledge was typical of the members of the PG. Chapter 2: Structuralists solvent The Structuralist response believes that the PG was doomed from the beginning due to their short(p) response to the demands of both the peasants and the workers, and the pressure endow on them by the war. There were serious problems in Russia however there were also genuinely high expectations of the PG, limitting pressure on them, and making it hard for them to in effect consolidate power.\r\nThese key issues included: the war, shoot distribution, national minorities, economy, and social reform, and in March of 1917 it was important the PG ma de a life- terrorening first impression. The key question involving the war was whether or not Russia should sue for immediate peace. This however would wear implications as it would be genuinely embarrassing and humiliating along with the severe loss of grease that would incur. If they were not to treat for immediate peace they faced another problem. Should they continue fighting aboard with their allies and try to gain dirt or fight a antiaircraft war and simply try not to lose any much(prenominal) territory?\r\nThe PG made a good plectrum in only fighting a defensive war. This however backfired when the Milyukov affair became apparent, and this cost the PG dearly. Although this problem could be seen to be a result of away(p) pressure and not an initial reason for their downfall, their initial reaction was simply the starting point from which the problems involving the war escalated out of control. The question involving the distribution of vote down was whether they should take land from the nobility and landowners and hand it over to the peasants or should they wait for the destiny fictionalisation to organise it in a more controlled way.\r\nThey immediately opted to stand back from these demands, and stated that they would wait for the luck Assembly to be elected so that they could stack with it more suitably. The PG adopted the same approach when serve welling the vital question of the demands of the working category in Russia. The Working class wanted much better conditions for both working and living; they also wanted eighter arcminute working geezerhood and elected members on factory committees.\r\nBeryl Williams wrote: â€Å" working class legislation was brought in by the PG: the right to strike, and to elect factory committees, an eight hour day, freedom and land reform… however these were postponed until the promised Constituent Assembly. ”[11] This made the workers and peasants restless and as the year progres ses they simply put more pressure on the PG. The dilemma involving national minorities was that neighbouring countries to Russia such as Finland, Ukraine, and Poland wanted independence. They stubborn to grant these countries independence as they thought they did not really have any control over them anyway.\r\nHowever this sparked disagreements at heart the party and turned out to be more important than the PG had originally thought. It resulted in the Kadets leaving the PG and this came as a huge loss of animation and meant Kerensky took over Lvov station as prime minister. The economic office staff in Russia was not good and picture of food and fuel needed to be increased. These key issues in March 1917 were precise important to the PG’s downfall. They gave them an opportunity to pass however due to poisonous decisions and miserable policies the PG was not able to consolidate power.\r\nThe Structuralists School sees these problems as a chance for the PG to show R ussia they were capable of leadership and the historian Darby refers to these time as a â€Å"window of opportunity. ”[12] However the PG’s inability to cope with such stresses among other strains put them immediately on a downward spiral. Chapter 3: Intentionalist response Although there is a lot of licence to suggest that the PG was doomed from the beginning there is also evidence which supports the contrary. Many of the issues that the PG failed to bargain with in March escalated and caused big problems deep down the body.\r\nThere were also key defects made that put support in the hands of the Bolsheviks and gave them a prime opportunity to seize power in October. As Beryl Williams wrote, â€Å"the PG created a climate in which its political opponents could return and flourish. ”[13] The initial policy that the PG had set up in response to the war was one of the only vaguely effective policies they had adopted; this however did not last long. On the 20t h April of that year a nitty-gritty from Milyukov (The Minister of Defence) that had been sent to the PG was leaked to the public and sparked divers(a) protests end-to-end Russia.\r\nThe note told the PG that the phalanx was to go on the offensive; however this was deeply unpopular with both the Soviet and the Russian people. Figes sees this as, â€Å"waving a red piece of paper in front of the Soviet bull,”[14] In response the Soviet called upon the people of aggressive countries to force their governments to negotiate peace and in doing so condemned Milyukov’s pledge. It is clear that the PG underestimated how much the Russian people, and soldiers wanted peace. As Mosley wrote, â€Å"not fully aware then of the widespread unwillingness of the Russian people to continue the war. [15] The Milyukov note is a key example of the outside pressure that helped in the collapse of the PG and it emphasises how blush a policy that seemed effective in March had backfired due to poor decisions made by key members in the body. This incident put the PG in a bad light and it was only to get worse. Another initial policy that touched the PG badly was the problem involving small neighbouring countries to the USSR and their zest for independence. Initially the PG had overlooked these demands, however as the demands grew the PG was forced to make a decision.\r\nThey made a quick decision as they felt that this issue would not impinge on anybody within the party or population. They gave these countries independence, however in doing so sparked unrest within the party. Many of the Kadets’ including Milyukov were very(prenominal) unhappy that these countries (Ukraine especially) had been granted independence, and as a result they remaining the PG. With the loss of Milyukov, Kerensky was appointed minister of war and Paves sees this as: â€Å"gravity shifting very predominantly to the left. [16] This resulted in the PG losing their impact on the pop ulation; it also cost them a lot of members and support and signalled another dance step towards their expiry. As the weeks went by the PG was failing to answer the peasant’s demands for the distribution of land. This meant that the PG was losing support as the peasants’ opinion of them became increasingly bad. Kowalski argues this: â€Å"The problem was that the peasant restraint was not rewarded. The PG with the support of the soviet procrastinated on the land question. [17] Iganev, a leader of a popular socialist party said: â€Å"We are unendingly being told, ‘later, later, not now, not until the Constituent Assembly’… however the land question must be resolved now! ”[18] This is a clear example of the pressure put on the PG. This view is back up by many historians such as Richard Pipes and over the years an Intentionalist School has been developed. They believe that it was the outside pressure put upon the PG that cost them, arguing that it was revolutionary leaders such as Lenin that led to the popularity of the PG diminishing whilst the popularity of other revolutionary groups grew.\r\nAnother example of the outside pressure put upon the PG is the political shift key of the Petrograd Soviet. They had transformed from (in March) being an institution supporting parliamentary democracy into instruments for revolutionary socialism, and there are military issues of this. According to Mosley there are two main reasons for this transformation: in the first place the Soviet’s were annoyed because the PG postponed for rising determination by the Constituent Assembly the solution of such pressing problems.\r\nThe second reason is largely a consequence of the first as there were festering opinions of the workers and peasant against the PG because they had failed to meet any of their demands, and conditions in Russia had not improved. This meant that the soviets felt they had to branch themselves away from t he failing PG to keep their reputation intact. The Bolsheviks also used this to their advantage as when they saw this poor reputation of the PG and their lack of support the Bolsheviks took a radical move to rub the PG out completely.\r\nThe Bolsheviks saw this opportunity: â€Å"At the Russian conference of the Bolshevik workers party on March 29, there was only one speaker who opposed the gaining control of power by the Bolsheviks and establishment of a proletariat dictatorship. And he was rules out of order. ”[19] This emphasises how from very early on in the PG’s reign people were looking to stamp out it and using Lenin’s intelligence they found a perfect opportunity. Using Propaganda they adopted a forward-looking party slogan of: â€Å"all power to the soviets. In doing so the Bolsheviks felt that they could rise to power through the Petrograd Soviet and then disband it when they got to a dominant position within the party. As a result of this the PG were left with very little support. As opposition to the PG grew there was one key incident that sparked the Bolshevik engine and this was the return of Lenin on the third April 1917. Previously to this Lenin had been in exile and had not been able to ignite Bolshevik movement. When he returned the Bolshevik workers parties were already willing to impose the PG but simply did not have the means to do so, and that is what Lenin brought to the table.\r\nLenin’s initial opinion was that he welcomed the revolution but saw it as only being in its first stage, the April thesis was Lenin’s radical program to introduce the second phase. The April thesis was announced almost immediately after Lenin’s return on the 16th April and it promised the population of Russia exactly what they wanted, which put the PG in a very bad light. The thesis included: No support to the PG; an immediate end to the war; fortify the workers to defend the revolution; the introduction of a wor ldwide socialist revolution; and most importantly it promised, â€Å"Land, peace and bread. [20] That was all the things that the PG had been to panicked to do, as they waited for a Constituent Assembly. The July days followed the PG’s summer offensive and were another key reason for the PG’s downfall. On 3rd July there were military uprisings against the army’s poor attempt at an offensive against the Germans on the western front. There were 400,000 casualties and this failure played into the hands of the Bolsheviks and made the PG look very bad for initiating the offensive. On the 4th July 20,000 sailors embarked on the city from Kronstadt marine base.\r\nAs the PG was to blame all the protestors wanted the soviet to take power. However when the soviet refused to do so they crowds were not sure what to do, and were restricted by the 176 regiment who were used to protect the government. This emphasises the opinions towards the PG and is another example of a p oor decision made by them which pushed them closer to being overthrown. However the July days also had a knock on effect on the Bolsheviks, because it was not uccessful in overthrowing the PG people wanted someone to blame and that person was Lenin.\r\nHowever some historians such as Figes argue that Lenin did not rattling have any role in organising the uprising. [21] The Kornilov affair was another example of outside pressure which resulted in a large loss of support for the PG and gave the Bolsheviks a more convincing role in the country as they gained support and spread the word of another revolution. By the end of terrific Kerensky felt that the only course bold to him was to restore law and order in the cities and to boost moral and discipline within the army.\r\nIn doing so he hoped he could put pressure back on the Bolsheviks and potentially people with any threat that they were to present. Kerensky appointed General Kornilov as bran- freshly supreme commander of the Ru ssian forces to try and boost moral. However General Kornilov had other ideas that emphasise his poor political genius and it rubbed off very badly on the PG and Kerensky. Kornilov felt that in his new position he could rally soldiers and he saw this as an opportunity to crush the radical socialists and restore military order through counter revolution.\r\nHowever Kerensky realised this and had to call for help from both the Petrograd Soviet and Bolsheviks which built the public’s suspicions that they could not effectively govern Russia. Conclusion: There is a lot of evidence that supports both arguments: that the PG was doomed from the beginning and that it was outside pressure that resulted in their collapse in October 1917. There are also various historians who support these arguments. manifest suggesting that the PG was doomed from the beginning is supported by famous historians such as Orlando Figes and Beryll Williams who agree with the Structuralist School.\r\nImpo rtant factors such as the immediate demands from peasants and workers were too strong for the PG to handle appropriately and they made a grave mistake in ignoring them. â€Å"The problem was that the peasant’s restraint was not rewarded. The PG procrastinated over the land question. ”[22] This was also the case when they tried to look at with the national minorities demands and this to had severe consequences resulting in a great loss of support and members. On the contrary however there is lashings of evidence that supports the counter argument, stating that the PG collapsed under outside pressure put on them throughout their rule.\r\nIssues such as the War and Bolshevik movement made the situation even harder and it became too much pressure for the PG to cope with. Also the increasing demands from peasants and workers after the PGs initial ignorance became much stronger and became a real problem for them which they failed to cope with. After looking in detail at bo th responses it is clear that the PG inherited problems however it was their inability to deal with these problems that immediately put them under a lot of pressure and made it much more difficult for them to consolidate power.\r\nThis initial hesitance tied the PGs hands rat their back and because the internal problems had not been dealt with by April they had no chance against the external threat from the Bolsheviks who were bent on their destruction. It can also be argued that the PG although being seen as the rulers of Russia did not actually do anything to meet any of the peasants of workers demands and did nothing to increase the standards of Russia at all. As Bernard Paves wrote: â€Å"The PG, although acknowledged as such for eight months cannot be said to actually have ruled Russia. [23] Bibliography • Bernard Paves †A history of Russia (published 1947 in London) • John Bradley †The Russian alteration (published 1988 in London) • Beryl Willia ms †Lenin, Profiles in Power (published 2000 in London) • Robert armed service †Stalin, a Bibliography (published2004 in London) • Richard Pipes †Russia Under the elder Regime (published1974 in Great Britain) • Leon Troski †Stalin (published 1947 in London) • Orlando Figes †A Peoples Tragedy (published 1996 in London) • Orlando Figes †The Whisperers (published in London) Chris hold †Stalin’s Russia (first published 1993, second discrepancy 1999 in London) • Chris Corin, Terry Feihn †communist Russia Under Lenin and Stalin (Published 2002 in London) • Tamara Pimlott †The Russian variation (first published 1985 in London) • Caroline Kennedy †Russia and the piece (first published 1998 in Great Britain) • Philip. E. Mosley †www. emayzine. com/lectures/russianrev • https://mars. wnec. edu/~grempel/courses/wc2/lectures/rev1917 • Beryl Williams †new pe rspective Volume 1. Number 2. (December 1995) • En. wikipedia. org/wiki/russian_Provisional_Govt\r\nAnnotated Bibliography Bernard Paves †A History of Russia (published 1947 in London): This book was serviceable as it gave me an insightful view of this power point in history and gave me an in depth structuralist opinion. John Bradley †The Russian Revolution (published 1988 in London): This book was useful as it gave me a greater understanding of some of the different opinions that surround this discipline. Beryl Williams †Lenin, Profiles in Power (published 2000 in London): This was useful as it gave me a wider founding of Lenin’s involvement in the destruction of the Provisional Government.\r\nRobert Service †Stalin, a Bibliography (published 2004 in London): This book provided me with an array of quotes and deepened my understanding of the Provisional Governments policies and mistakes. Richard Pipes †Russia Under the Old Regime (published 1974 in Great Britain): Gave me an insight to the Bolshevik policies that lead up to the Provisional Governments downfall. Leon Troski †Stalin (published 1947 in London): This book was very enkindle and gave me a look at the lead up to Stalin’s reign which was the downfall of the Provisional Government.\r\nOrlando Figes †A Peoples Tragedy (published 1996 in London): Was very interesting and gave the views of the population of Russia along with the policies and thoughts of the leading bodies in Russia. Orlando Figes †The Whisperers (published in London): This book gave me more back ground knowledge astir(predicate) the idea and helped me understand some of the reasons arse the revolutions of 1917. Chris Ward †Stalin’s Russia (first published 1993, second edition 1999 in London): This book was helpful because it gave me a lot of statistics and views that emphasised some of the main points throughout the Provisional Governments reign.\r\nChris Cori n, Terry Feihn †communist Russia Under Lenin and Stalin (Published 2002 in London): Gave in more detail some of the main points behind Lenin’s campaign and how he managed to overthrow the Provisional Government. Also was helpful in other parts of the course. Tamara Pimlott †The Russian Revolution (first published 1985 in London): Was helpful in giving me quotes and facts throughout the middle months of the Provisional Governments reign, things such as the July days and frontward to October.\r\nCaroline Kennedy †Russia and the World (first published 1998 in Great Britain): Some information about the day the Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government at the Tauride Palace. Philip. E. Mosley †www. emayzine. com/lectures/russianrev: This book was useful as it gave me information about the members of all the parties and some of the internal problems the Provisional Government faced. https://mars. wnec. edu/~grempel/courses/wc2/lectures/rev1917: G ave me an overview of the topic and helped me understand the bases of the Provisional Government leadership.\r\nBeryl Williams †new perspective Volume 1. Number 2. (December 1995): This word was useful as it provides some quotes and helped me understand the role of Kerensky better. En. wikipedia. org/wiki/russian_Provisional_Govt: Gave me an overview of the year and put all the events into context whilst giving some opinions of popular historians. ———————†[1] A time from March to April where the Provisional Government could have satisfied the people and had they done so would have been able to consolidate their power however they failed to do so. 2] Slogan used by Lenin to raise up up the people of Russia and undermine the Provisional Government prior to overthrowing them. [3] John Bradley, The Russian Revolution, London (1988) p56 [4] Robert Service, Stalin, a bibliography, London (2004) p129 [5] Phillip. E. Mosley www. emayzine . com/lectures/russiarev [6] Orlando Figes, A Peoples Tragedy, London (1996) [7] Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, New York (1990) [8] Bernard Paves, A History of Russian, London (1947) p531 [9] Mosley www. emayzine. om/lectures/russiarev [10] Mosley, www. emayzine. com/lectures/russiarev [11] Beryl Williams, Lenin, profiles in power , London (2000) p63 [12] Robert Darby agrees with the Structuralist School. Argues it was the ignorance of Provisional Government that resulted in their failure. [13] Williams, Lenin, profiles in power, p 63 [14] Figes, A people tragedy [15] Mosley, www. emayzine. com/lectures/russianrev [16] Paves, A History of Russia, p 533 [17] Kowalski, Russian Revolution 1917-1921, p 133 18] Kowalski, Russian Revolution 1917-1921, p 134 [19] Mosley, www. emayzine. com/lectures/russianrev [20] summon from Lenin’s April thesis emphasises how Lenin gave them exactly what they wanted. [21] Figes, A Peoples Tragedy [22] Kowalski Russian Revolution 1917-1921 , p 133 [23] Paves A History of Russia, p 532 ———————†intelligence information count: 350 articulate count: 403 article count: 478 volume count: 260 enounce count: 439 tidings count: 167 Word count: 431 Word count: 434 Word Count: 442 Word count: 222 Word count: 373\r\n'